As a decade that began with war in Korea, the 1950s were a time of amplified hostility and fear for American and Soviet policymakers as well as the millions of citizens around the world whose fates were in their hands. A series of events and indicators caused 1940s containment strategy to mutate into 1950s domino theory. Whole regions of Asia seemed in danger of succumbing to the inevitable, cohesive ideology of Communism; a 1950 letter from National Security Resources Board chairman, Stuart Symington, asserted that “With relatively minor exceptions, everything would now seem to be going according to [the Soviets’] schedule for world conquest” (qtd. Engel 193). From the inconclusive armistice that ended the Korean War to the launch of Sputnik in 1957, Americans seemed to be losing, and Communists in Europe and Asia on the march.
On a more existential level, the Cold War offered, to Eisenhower’s mind in April 1954, at best “a life of perpetual fear and tension” or—at worst—“atomic war.” Though he decried this path “of fear and force,” Eisenhower went along with the militarization required to keep doomsday from occurring (qtd. Engel 196). By the time he left office, Eisenhower had to admit that the United States had transformed itself from an isolationist, industrious democracy to a permanently-militarized war machine. Though he spoke worriedly about the “military-industrial complex” in his Farewell Address, as president, Eisenhower had been unable to mitigate the force of domestic fear; the reality of violence in Korea, Hungary, and elsewhere; and the destabilizing effects of decolonization around the globe that opened ground for Communist expansion. So in the 1950s, the most powerful person on the planet, the President of the United States, could not help but be controlled by Cold War forces.
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